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Abstract 
In this study, we explore the role of education in explaining the labour market outcomes for 
graduates in medicine. More specifically, we focus on the question: To what extent are 
labour market outcomes of physicians explained by the skills acquired in education, as 
argued in the theory of Human Capital, by competences already present at the start of 
education, as suggested by the Screening theory literature, or by having attained the medical 
degree as such, as suggested by the literature on Credentialism? The study uses separate 
measurements of competence at the start and at the end of academic education. These are 
grade point averages (GPA’s) of secondary school, available at the start of the first year of 
study, versus the final (medical) Skills test at the end of the study. Moreover, we use a direct 
measurement of competence development during medical education in the form of Progress 
Test results; the first Progress Test result in the first year, versus the final Progress Test 
result in the fourth year of study. This enables us to disentangle the effects of the three 
suggested mechanisms. The results suggest that after graduation the human capital factors 
available do not explain subsequent differences in labour market outcomes. The data 
therefore suggest evidence for Credentialism. However, selection processes during 
education and in the response to the labour market survey, take place on human capital 
acquired before and during education.  
 
 
JEL-code: J24 
Keywords: human capital, productivity 
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1 Introduction and Problem Statement 
The selection and allocation process for physicians 
After medical students have passed their medical qualifying examination (after the doctoral 
program and two years of clinical clerkships), they face a rather unique selection and 
allocation process on the labour market. This process is different from the processes other 
academic graduates face, because of the typical features of the medical study: it is highly 
standardized for every student and it aims to prepare for further specialisation into highly 
professional medical jobs. These are to be obtained by following further educational 
trajectories that are combined with work in practice. Some empirical research on the 
transition from education to the labour market of physicians suggests that this further 
selection and allocation looks like a lottery (Borghans & Ramaekers, 1993). No clear 
educational or human capital factors seem to explain the attainment of a specialisation 
position, or why one candidate is selected over another.1 Without any further explaining 
variables in, or during, medical education, it seems only possible to interpret the selection 
and allocation process for physicians directly after graduation, as a form of Credentialism 
(Collins, 1979). In this perspective, the amount of human capital, or indications/signals of 
future productivity do not play a role of importance.     
 
In our view, randomness in selection, suggesting a solely certifying role of medical education 
seems illegitimate without a strong link with the underlying quality of what has been learnt. It 
is also at odds with educational literature concerning the relationship between medical 
competence and (better) professional functioning (see e.g., Norcini & Lipner, 2000; Tamblyn 
et al., 1998). Specialisation positions differ in complexity and training intensity and graduates 
also differ in trainability, or learning competences, and acquired medical competences. 
Although following the same medical course offers the same minimum quality, there are still 
differences in the competences between good and mediocre students. Why then would these 
differences not predict the labour market chances of physicians, such as it would be 
expected to make a difference for other graduates from other study fields as well?  
 
Measurement Problems 
A possible reason of the apparent absence of relevant human capital predictors may be the 
lack of adequate measures. Trainability or learning competences and acquired medical 
competences are rarely measured as such, simply because measurements for these 
individual characteristics are scarce in labour market research (see e.g., Sø  renson, 1994).   
                                               
1. Others indicate that the attainment of a medical assistantship (not in training) in a hospital, after 
graduation, will increase the probability of obtaining a medical specialisation position (in training) 
afterwards (Van den Berg et al., 2002). This suggests a possible human capital or screening 
explanation, after already having entered the labour market. Because the amount of the working 
experience as a medical assistant seems to have no differentiating effect on the probability of 
becoming a specialist in training, the authors conclude the effect of having worked as a medical 
assistant is merely a signal for employers. It signals the expected productivity in, and/or interests of 
the candidates for a medical career as a specialist. This is in line with screening or sorting theory 
(see for example Thurow, 1975; Weiss, 1995). 
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In educational research, such instruments are not easily available either. Many studies reveal 
that the assessment of competences during academic education is not always in line with the 
desired competence outcomes for students; examinations seem to direct the learning 
behaviour of students, leading sometimes to good study results (see e.g., Irandoust & 
Karlsson, 2002), but not always to rooted (deeply incorporated) knowledge and competence 
(Verhoeven, 2003). It is therefore necessary to carefully consider the instruments used for 
measuring learning outcomes; whether they really refer to the presence of (development of) 
desired competence(s). Otherwise competence is measured that is not desirable and 
instruments will not be informative for explaining selection processes on the labour market. 
This may lead to possible wrong conclusions about the value of competences learnt in 
education. 
 
Purpose of the study 
In this study, we want to investigate the role of (medical) education by instruments used in 
the program, in the selection and allocation of physicians on the labour market. Educational 
empirical data concerning the learning competences and the more study specific 
competence development of the students are used. We use a rather unique data set of 
physicians graduated at Maastricht University (The Netherlands). These data contain several 
types of assessments during the medical study. These types of assessments have different 
measurement properties within the educational context. Thereby they measure different 
aspects of the (medical) competence students have to master at the end of their program. In 
addition, these different types of measurement have differential effects on the learning 
behaviour of the students. One type of assessment in particular, the so-called Progress Test, 
has revealed to have the desired effects on learning behaviour in an academic educational 
context (Verhoeven, 2003). The test measures growth in competence of students in the 
medical knowledge domain as defined by the educational end-objectives (Van der Vleuten et 
al., 1996). It is not possible to prepare oneself specifically for this test, since it measures the 
students’ present knowledge of the complete medical domain. In other words, the test meets 
our criteria to measure the growth and final level in the actual acquired medical 
competences, at least for its knowledge component. It therefore refers to a form of human 
capital directly acquired in medical education. Two other types of assessment, the so-called 
Block Tests and Skills Tests, are more traditional instruments. Traditional in the sense that 
they measure the mastery of the content of certain courses covering well-defined sub-
domains of the medical knowledge domain, and the mastery of clinical procedures during 
diagnosis and medical practice in directly observed simulated situations, respectively. These 
tests have course tailored standards and do not measure growth in medical expertise 
components across time. For the Skills Test results at the end of the medical program (fourth 
year) this means the results may reflect directly acquired human capital in medical education, 
but this amount of acquired human capital cannot be compared to the amount in an earlier 
stage. The Block Test scores reflect the results of acquired human capital (knowledge 
component), but may also account for already present capacities of students in acquiring the 
knowledge, and therefore reflect a more ‘screening’, or ‘signalling’, element that may be of 
importance for employers. However, for Block Tests, studies have indicated that they are 
related to different, and perhaps less desirable learning style aspects than the Progress 
Tests (Van Berkel et al., 1995; Verhoeven, 2003). This is something to keep in mind when 
analysing the data and interpreting the results. We also include available grade point 
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averages (GPA’s) of secondary school as an indicator of the competence level before or at 
the start of the medical study. When relevant for labour market outcomes, these are 
indicating a more screening value of medical education, more than the Block Tests scores; 
by using GPA’s we are able to measure the already present capabilities of people separately 
from competence development in medical education. Both will be related to labour market 
outcomes of physicians in terms of the type of medical job they have obtained, a year and a 
half after graduation. The value of the instruments used for labour market outcomes will be 
informative for the validity of the assumed mechanisms (Credentialism, Human Capital, 
Screening) in selection and allocation on the medical labour market. 
The remainder of this paper will be organised as follows: in section 2, the theoretical 
background for our analyses will be presented. In section 3, the data and the method of 
research are addressed. In section 4, the results of the analyses will be presented. Finally, in 
section 5, conclusions and considerations for future research will be discussed.  
 
2 Theoretical background 
Three different explanations for the role of education in selection on the labour market. 
It goes without saying that having attained a medical degree as such plays an important role 
in the selection process. This degree is needed for legal functioning in the health sector as a 
physician. Without the medical certificate, no employer, no hospital, no health organization 
can hire a candidate as a physician. The question is however to what extent other and 
additional selection criteria play a role, or whether the medical degree serves as an sufficient 
entrance ticket to medical professions as suggested in the Credentials theory (Collins, 1979). 
The sufficiency of the medical degree is thus considered explanation one, referring to a 
Credential argument. 
A second explanation points to the relation between success in education and learning 
capacities. When physicians enter the labour market, their learning process has far from 
ended. Specialisation programs, and other medical jobs as well, imply further learning to 
extend the already acquired basics of the academic medical program. It could therefore be of 
interest to future employers to select the candidate with the best learning or training ability. 
This is especially relevant for graduated physicians, because they face their rather unique 
labour market compared to other graduates, with many further training positions. The 
candidate with the best learning ability will have the best chance for succeeding in further 
specialisation and learning will occur at the smallest costs. In labour market research this line 
of thought is actually captured by the Screening or Signalling hypothesis (see for example 
Thurow, 1975; Spence, 1974). It states that employers use educational screening devices 
(like diploma’s or study results) as signals about the underlying learning ability. In the case of 
our physicians, the medical degree is not differentiating as such, for screening purposes. 
However, (average) medical study achievements, or GPA’s (of secondary school) may serve 
this purpose. 
A third explanation pertains to the fact that individual differences in learning ability lead to 
individual differences in the acquisition and level of mastery of specific medical competences 
in education. These latter differences may play a role on their own in the selection and 
allocation on the labour market. Specialisation tracks and other medical jobs differ in length, 
intensity and in the type of (medical) competences required. Therefore, the more medical 
competences a graduate possesses, at the end of the academic medical study, the more 
attractive this graduate will be. This line of thought is supported by the Human Capital 
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hypothesis (see for example Becker, 1983; McNabb, 1987). This hypothesis states that 
people acquire skills or competences during education that are relevant for their future jobs. 
These skills or competences make people more productive and thus attractive for the labour 
market.2 Employers may therefore well be interested in indicators of direct productive 
competences of physicians. These competences, or aspects of competences, may well be 
reflected by the Progress test results at the end of medical education, especially when 
controlled for the start level (first Progress Test) and the Skills Test result at the end of 
education. 
 
Measurement problems with respect to selection criteria 
Finding relevant indicators for the role of education for selection and allocation has been 
rather problematic in labour market research, because the measurements are not well 
distinguished in sustaining the different explanations. One important reason for this is the 
absence of separate measures for learning capacities and acquired competences in 
education. Most indicators for schooling, like ‘years of schooling’, or ‘attained level of 
education’, or even the already mentioned ‘study results’ reflect both the ability to achieve a 
certain level (reflecting the amount of already present learning capacity), as well as the 
acquisition of certain skills. Although study achievement results may be appealing for the 
measurement of competence acquisition during education, the meaning of most traditional 
achievement results is not beyond an indication of the performance of a student on an 
educational test on a given moment in time, without a longitudinal perspective on what 
exactly has been learnt (see for example Lindblom-Ylänne & Lonka, 2001; Baker, 2001). 
Therefore, study results can reflect both (already present) learning ability and a certain type 
of actual acquired competences, depending on the type of test (e.g., skills test, knowledge 
test). 
In addition, the measurement of actual competence acquisition requires a direct monitoring 
of the actual learning process during education, thereby requiring certain features of the 
instrument, i.e. longitudinal measurement properties (standardized scale across 
measurements) and repeated measures. And this type of data is scarce (Sø  rensen, 1994).  
 
A third problem is that learning ability (i.e. already present learning capacity) and the actual 
competence development during medical education may have interrelated or combined 
effects in assessment during the educational program. Separate effects on labour market 
outcomes may then be hard to determine, due to high correlations between the two. And 
multicollinearity may occur, that can lead to unjust inconsistent or insignificant results (see for 
example Ethington et al., 2002, for an explanation of the phenomenon; and Cawley et al., 
2001, for an example of studying separate effects of  ‘cognitive ability’ and ‘education’ on 
wages). It would require theoretically perfectly separated instruments for measuring both 
elements to overcome this problem. Instruments such as the Intelligence Quotient Score (IQ) 
or the Scholastic Aptitude score are used for measuring learning ability in terms of cognitive 
aptitudes (see e.g., Atkinson et al., 1987). However, others argue that ‘learning ability’ 
                                               
2. Apart from the purely selective criteria from the view of the employer, individual preferences with 
respect to work and the individuals’ self-knowledge of medical and other work related competences 
will lead to a certain amount of self-selection of candidates for specialisation tracks or other 
medical jobs. 
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should, or cannot be separated from the specific competence for which it is used  (see e.g., 
Perkins & Salomon, 1989; Glaser, 1990). This implies that the development of competence 
during education also captures already present (learning) abilities.    
 
Some solutions to the measurement problems   
One solution put forward in this paper to overcome the before-mentioned problems is the use 
of a specific test, the so-called Progress Test. This test is considered to measure the growth 
in cognitive competence (knowledge) concerning the entire medical domain (Van der Vleuten 
et al., 1996). In section 3 (data and methodology) this test will be discussed in detail. 
However, the availability of this instrument will not guarantee a separate measurement of a 
specific component in the competence development process. It may also capture more 
generic capacities of competence of people, such as their learning ability to acquire this 
specific knowledge.  
Therefore, the second solution we put forward in this paper is to separate measurements 
relevant for the different assumed selection and allocation mechanisms on the labour market 
in time: we will measure the competence level of students at the start of their medical 
education (referring to the more screening mechanism) and the competence development 
and competence level at the end of their education (referring to the more human capital 
acquisition mechanism). In this way, the competences already present before education and 
the competences actually developed in education can be separated. Then, under the 
restriction that we are able to avoid multicollinearity, we will be able to test the labour market 
theoretical inferences about the role of education for physicians. The research question then 
is whether medical education really adds labour market important competences during the 
educational process (human capital), or whether the competences already present before or 
at the start of medical education can already explain selection and the labour market 
outcomes (signalling and/or screening), or whether the attainment of the medical degree as 
such will explain it all, without further consideration of skills (referring to credentialism). 
 
Research model and hypotheses 
For the selection and allocation process on the labour market for physicians, we argued 
three elements can be measured separately; the medical degree as such, the competences 
learnt during medical education (by indicators of competence at the end of the academic 
program, i.e. the final Progress Test, the Skills Test and the mean Block Test scores of the 
fourth year), and the level of competence already present at the start or even before the start 
of medical education (by indicators of competence at the start of the academic program, i.e. 
GPA’s, the first Progress Test in the first year, and the mean Block Test scores of the first 
year). The relations of the competence levels with labour market outcomes are presented in 
figure 1. 
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Figure 1  
Model of possible effects of competence levels at different times in the educational process 
on labour market outcomes for physicians 
 
When the role of education is merely to guarantee an entrance ticket, we expect no further 
effects of competence levels at the start or at the end of education on labour market 
outcomes. This means we expect no effects of relations 2 and 3. In this case, findings could 
be interpreted in terms of evidence for the Credentialism mechanism. The existence of a 
possible positive relation 1 is not exclusive for one theoretical assumption. However, 
Crendentialism leaves it out of consideration entirely, whereas Screening and Human Capital 
can very well explain such a relation. When medical education is merely important for its 
reflection of a desired competence level already present before the actual medical training 
takes place (as can be explained by the Screening thought), indicators of competence levels 
at the start of the medical program must have an effect on labour market outcomes (3). It is 
likely, though, that the competence level at the start of medical education will affect the 
competence development and subsequently the acquired level of competence at the end of 
medical education (1, 2). Therefore, when the medical program itself adds competences 
relevant for work (such as can be explained by Human Capital theory), the acquired 
competence level at the end of education must be of relevance (2), even after controlling for 
the effects of previous competence levels. It may also be possible that both the competence 
level at the start as well as the competence level at the end of medical education will have 
independent effects on labour market outcomes, resulting in positive relations 2 and 3, after 
controlling for relation 1. 
 
More specifically, the following relations will be tested: 
a Indicators of competence at the end of the medical study (acquired competence) affect 
individual labour market outcomes (human capital, relation 2, controlled for 1); 
b Indicators of competence at the start of the study affect labour market outcomes, even 
after controlling for the effects of end-level indicators (screening argument, relation 3, and 
1 controlled for 2). 
 
The relation between the start level indicators of competence and the end level indicators of 
competence (relation1 in the research model) will be tested independently and explicitly as 
well, although this is not the main theoretical focus of this paper. Therefore the results of this 
analysis will be dealt with in an appendix (i.e. Appendix 4).  
 
In the following section, the data and methodology for testing the research model will be 
outlined. 
Indicators of 
competence level at 
the start of medical 
education ( i.e. GPA’s, 
first Progress Test 
Indicators of competence level at 
the end of medical education (i.e. 
final Progress Test scores, Skills 
Test scores and mean Block Test 
Labour market 
outcomes a year 
and a half after 
graduation; type 
of medical job 
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3 Data and methodology 
Subjects 
The research population consists of medical students of Maastricht University, who started 
their medical study in 1989-1991. 
 
Instruments for competence measurement 
Indicators of the competence level at the start of the medical program are: 
- GPA’s (Mean final exam scores secondary school); 
- First Progress Test score in the first year of study; 
- Mean Block Test scores of the first year. 
 
Indicators of the competence level at the end of the medical program are: 
- Final Progress Test score of fourth year; 
- Mean Block Test scores of fourth year; 
- Skills Test score of fourth year. 
 
Multiple indicators are used, because of their differentiated measurement properties and their 
possibly different importance in measuring what employers may be interested in (such as 
specific medical skills, specific medical knowledge, or a more generic indication of the 
already present learning capacity of graduates). 
The data used for competence indicators have the following features: 
 
Progress Test scores: these are gathered during the medical program four times a year and 
capture the growth in specific medical competence (knowledge aspect) during the years of 
study, because each tests covers the total relevant medical knowledge domain. The total 
score on the test is expressed as a percentage of the correct answers minus the incorrect 
answers. The Progress Test scores meet to a large extent the measurement criteria as 
proposed by Sø rensen (1994) to be able to measure actual competence development during 
education. Although the medical study takes 6 years, we will use the first Progress test score 
of the first year of study as an indication of competence at the start of medical education, and 
the final Progress test score of the fourth year (final year of doctoral program) as an 
indication of the competence level at the end of the medical program (referring to actual 
acquired human capital in education). The last two years of the medical study are meant for 
the so-called clerkships, in which working and learning in practice is the most important 
element. For detailed information about the Progress Test, its validity and reliability for our 
measurement purpose, and relevant references, we refer to Appendix 1. 
 
Block Test scores: these are gathered six times a year and cover only course-related sub-
domains of medical expertise. It is basically a knowledge test of about 150 items that is 
administered after every block period (curriculum unit) of six weeks. It covers the contents of 
the course and tests the mastery of end-objectives of the course on a percentage scale. 
Therefore these tests give no information on the general growth in medical competence. 
They reflect whether the student has passed the course successfully. We will use the mean 
Block Test scores of the first year and the mean scores of the fourth year (final year of the 
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doctoral program) as indicators of competence at the start and at the end of medical 
education respectively.  
 
Skills Test scores: these are gathered only once a year during the medical program. They 
are aimed at testing mastery of clinical procedural skills through direct observation of 
students carrying out these skills across a number of simulated clinical situations. Trained 
examiners use checklists to score performance. Percentage scores reflect the amount of 
well-performed tasks as registered. The test covers an increasing amount of clinical skills 
every year, in line with the skills students are trained for. 
We use the Skills tests scores of the fourth year of the medical program as an indicator of the 
end-level competence of students (acquired human capital). The reason we make no use of 
the first year scores for an indication of start level competence is that the test is administered 
at the end of the first study year and therefore probably biased by learning effects of a 
complete year of study. 
 
GPA’s: the grade point averages (mean final exam scores of secondary school) are a highly 
standardized measure in the Netherlands expressed on a scale from 1-10. They determine 
whether the student has successfully passed the secondary school (scores 5.5-10) or not 
(scores 1-5.4) and therefore reflect the attained school-success of the graduates before 
entering the medical program. In our sample, only scores between 5.5 and 10 are possibly 
present, since not having passed the final exam will not allow one to enter medical 
education. 
When you have passed the final exam, students for medicine are selected on their GPA’s. 
However, in the Netherlands, this did not mean you had no chance to enter the program 
when you were not scoring very high in our research sample (students starting in1998-1991): 
students were grouped based on ranges of GPA-scores. Only a certain percentage of each 
group was allowed to enter, and the selection of students for this percentage was at random. 
When you were part of the group with the highest scores, you were part of a relative small 
group. Your individual chance to enter the program was then higher than for lower scoring 
students. They were part of a larger group what therefore decreased their individual chance 
to be selected. We use GPA’s as an indicator of the competence level at the start of medical 
education, referring to a possible signal or screening device for employers.    
 
Instrument for the measurement of labour market outcomes 
Labour market information is gathered by a labour market survey enclosing our subjects who 
started their medical study in 1989-1991. This labour market survey is conducted every year 
by the Research Centre of Education and the Labour Market (Dutch short-cut ROA) and 
gathers labour market information, as well as educational evaluative data, from graduates 
one year and a half after graduation. The graduation cohorts of 1995-2000 are included to 
obtain our research sample of about 290 physicians for whom data for all our educational 
variables (competence levels at the start and at the end of medical education) and our labour 
market outcome variables in terms of obtained position are available. 
 
Specifically, the following labour market indicators are used from the labour market survey, 
pertaining to job chances and the quality of the job (Van der Velden & Wieling, 1994): 
- Having a physicians’ job (dummy variable); 
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- Having a specialisation position (dummy variable); 
- Category of common types of jobs/positions; in training for social medicine jobs3 (1),  
- for general practitioner (2), or for a hospital specialisation (3), resident not in training  
- (4) and PhD students (5);   
- Type of specialisation ordered by required training period, reflecting further investment in 
human capital and thereby expected lifetime income; in training for social medicine jobs 
(1), for general practitioner (2), or for a hospital specialisation (3). 
 
For further argumentation on the use of these labour market indicators, see Appendix 2. 
 
Control Variables 
In addition, personal data are included in the analyses as relevant control variables. These 
are gender and age. After graduation mostly women are interested in part-time work. 
Possibilities for part-time work are largest in social medicine positions, even during the 
training period. Age may play a role because it reflects experience gained in earlier work and 
life (human capital argument). On the other hand, age may also have a negative effect, 
because the returns on investments become relative low for a candidate (human capital 
argument), and/or a candidate may become less flexible with age, which can interfere with 
the demanding learning process in specialisation (selection argument).  
Socialisation processes are important learning sources for physicians (Slotnick, 2001). The 
(self-) selection on age fits this context. In all, the age effect will depend on the range in ages 
among the research subjects. As a final control variable, year of entry in the labour market 
will be used, to control for fluctuations in the labour market demand of physicians for specific 
(specialisation) jobs.  
 
Method of analysis 
We will test the effects of education on the different labour market outcomes in different (sub)  
models; in the first model, we will estimate the effects of the competence level at the start of  
the medical education (in fact the Screening mechanism). In the second model, the effect of 
the competences at the end of medical education will be tested (in fact the mechanism of 
acquired Human Capital). In the third and final model, both indicators of competence level at 
the start as well as indicators of competence level at the end of medical education are 
included, to measure their combined effects. In all three models we control for age, gender 
and year of entry in the labour market. For the different labour market indicators, binary 
logistic regression, multi-nominal logistic regression and ordinal regression analyses are 
used.  
Before conducting the labour market analyses, the data will be controlled for multicollinearity 
and selection bias in the research subjects’ competence scores. The relation between the 
start level indicators of competence and the end level indicators will be dealt with in Appendix 
4 by normal regression analysis. 
                                               
3. Social Medicine in the Netherlands includes occupational (and insurance) medicine on the one 
hand, and public health (including a.o. mother-and-child care, sports medicine and epidemiology) 
on the other hand. 
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4 Results 
Descriptives for all variables 
Descriptive results of all variables used in the analyses and Pearson’s correlations are 
presented in table 1. All study results variables in table 1 reflect percentile scores of correct 
or correct-minus-incorrect answers. However, the GPA’s are on a scale from 1-10 and 
because all students have passed the exam, only scores from 6-10 are present in our 
sample. Correlations between study variables are significantly positive. The largest 
correlation is between the final Progress Test and the mean Block Test score of the fourth 
year for the end-level indicators, even larger than the considerable correlations between the 
first and fourth year Block Test scores, and between the GPA’s and the mean first year Block 
Test scores. This suggests the measurement of common elements at both the start and end 
of education by different knowledge testing instruments. Because the correlations are 
considerably high (ranging from 0.517 to 0.574), we consider the presence of multicollinearity 
between the different instruments at the start and at the end of education before conducting 
further analyses. We do this by comparing the effects of the different instruments together 
and separately on labour market outcomes, as well as in different combinations (pairs of 
predictors). It appears that the effects of the Mean Block Test scores, both at the start and at 
the end of education, seem to cause the largest differences in parameter estimates (ß’s and 
s.e.’s), when including more predictors in the models. These differences appear to be larger 
than may be expected, based on the separate effects of the different instruments. Without 
including the Mean Block Test scores, the possible problem of multicollinearity seems 
omitted. Therefore we decide to leave the Mean Block Test scores out of further analysis. 
 
Another possible problem for the interpretation of our results refers to selective processes 
affecting the competence levels. Selective processes may bias the effects of competence 
indicators on the acquisition of competence in academic education, graduation, and 
responding to the labour market survey. Although internal publications indicate that drop-out 
(selection bias) among students in medicine is often due to other (more personal) factors 
than differences in competence levels (Van Luijk et al., 1990; Perquin, 1999), we like to 
empirically consider the possible selectivity in our analyses. We do this by conducting 
sequential logistic regression analyses with our competence indicators for three relevant 
selective moments, i.e. the availability of our end-level competence indicators for the 
students who started the medical study, graduation by the year 2000, and response to the 
labour market survey. The results of these sequential analyses and the differences in the 
means of the competence level indicators are presented in table I in appendix 3. They reveal 
that for all our competence instruments used, the subjects in our remaining research sample 
have already higher scores due to selective processes during education, graduation by the 
year 2000, and/or responding to the labour market survey. We should take this into account 
when interpreting the results of our further analyses, i.e., the effects of the scores on our 
instruments on labour market outcomes for physicians. 
 
  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson's correlations 
  Correlation Coëfficients  
Variables  Mean SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
                                        
Indicators of Labour Market Entry Success                    
1) Being employed as a physician 0,984 0,127 489                
 in analyses: 0,983 0,129 295                
2) Having obtained a specialization position 0,430 0.490 484                
 in analyses: 0,430 0.500 291                
Specialisation/Job category:                    
3) Social medicine 0,069 0,253 480                
 in analyses: 0,073 0,261 288  -  -  -             
4) General practitioner 0,166 0,372 483                
 in analyses: 0,182 0,387 291  -  -  -  -            
5) Hospital specialisation 0,138 0,346 484                
 in analyses: 0,130 0,337 292  -  -  -  -  -           
6) Resident not in training 0,468 0,500 483                
 in analyses: 0,462 0,499 292  -  -  -  -  -  -          
7) PhD student 0,048 0,213 483                
 in analyses: 0,048 0,214 292  -  -  -  -  -  -  -         
Competence level start medical education  
8) GPA's  6,858 0,652 1434                
 in analyses: 6,883 0,673 295  0,055  0,010 -0,095  0,054  0,041  0,007  0,103*  -         
9) First Progress Test score in first year 9,884 12,010 968                
 in analyses: 4,619 3,276 295  0,025  0,080  0,034  0,141** -0,059 -0,121**  0,029  0,082  -        
10) Mean Block Test score first year 45,174 7,723 746                
 in analyses: 45,922 7,141 295  0,012 -0,010 -0,123**  0,095 -0,060 -0,003  0,129**  0,517***  0,170***  -       
Competence level and medical education  
11) Final Progress Test score in fourth year  32,256 8,164 727                
 in analyses: 33,674 7,858 295  0,033  0,051 -0,071  0,011  0,070 -0,068  0,053  0,352***  0,020 0,362***  -     
12) Mean Block Test score of fourth year 41,287 6,740 723                
 in analyses: 42,671 6,584 295  0,043  0,080 -0,030  0,093 -0,001 -0,062  0,108*  0,344*** -0,003 0,552*** 0,574***  -     
13) Skills Test score of the fourth year 80,107 8,321 683                
 in analyses: 81,680 7,346 295  0,031  0,081 -0,062  0,078 -0,004 -0,029  0,023  0,235***  0,005 0,359*** 0,240***  0,382***  -    
 
 
 
 Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson's correlations 
  Correlation Coëfficients  
Variables  Mean SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
Control Variables 
                   
14) Male   0,388 0,488 505                
 in analyses: 0,384 0,487 294  0,050 -0,076 -0,142** -0,064  0,050  0,049  0,020 -0,071 -0,008 -0,071 0,018 -0,100* -0,180***   
15) Age 28,010 3,080 504               
 in analyses: 27,550 2.450 295  0,029  0,068  0,101*  0,034  0,008 -0,105* -0,038 -0,165***  0,344*** -0,060 -0,046 -0,201*** -0,189***  0,198*** 
16) Year of labour market entry 1996 0,185 0,389 508               
 in analyses: 0,173 0,379 295  0,060  0,013 -0,023  0,116** -0,044 -0,010 -0,019  0,078  0,259*** -0,021 -0,172*** -0,049 -0,020  0,007 -
0,021
17) Year of entry 1997 0,187 0,390 508               
 in analyses: 0,251 0,434 295 -0,045 -0,008 -0,041 -0,030  0,106*  0,060 -0,057 -0,030  0,036 -0,082 -0,036 -0,091 -0,020 -0,017 0,060
18) Year  of entry 1998 0,183 0,387 508               
 in analyses: 0,278 0,449 295  0,023  0,052  0,067  0,045 -0,015 -0,075 -0,069  0,057 -0,140** -0,026  0,312***  0,044 -0,040 -0,055 0,001
19) Year of entry 1999 0,173 0,379 508               
 in analyses: 0,220 0,415 295  0,070 -0,012 -0,024 -0,103* -0,036 -0,010  0,114* -0,077 -0,076  0,046 -0,053  0,079  0,016*  0,101* -
0,055
20 Year of entry 2000 0,136 0,343 508               
 in analyses: 0,075 0,263 295 -0,163*** -0,089 -0,024 -0,023 -0,024  0,075  0,066 -0,044 -0,112*  0,144** -0,154***  0,021  0,095 -0,039 0,005
 
Note 1:*correlation is significant at the 0.10 lever (2-tailed), ** correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) and *** correlation is significant at the 0.01 lever. (2-tailed). 
Note 2: Year of labour market entry 1995 (dummy) becomes too small a category with m=0.003 and sd=0.058 in the analyses, which makes Year of entry 1996 the 
reference category. 
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Effects of levels of competence on obtaining a physicians’ job 
Based on table 1, we can argue that almost all graduates have obtained a physicians' job a 
year and a half after graduation (almost 98,5%). This is considered and confirmed for all 
available (non-matching) cases in the labour market survey data as well. It is therefore 
almost superfluous to conduct a logistic regression for this indicator, because almost no 
variation is present. The binary logistic regression analyses indeed confirm this expectation, 
by revealing no effects of any of the (competence) variables included in the analyses. The 
results are presented in table 2. As can be seen from table 2, only positive effects of year of 
entry (1998) in the labour market appear. So far, the medical study seems to garantee a 
medical job after graduation. 
 
Table 2 
Regression estimates of the effects of competence levels at the start and at the end of medical 
education on having a physicians’ job a year and a half after graduation 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B s.e. B s.e B s.e. 
              
       
Constant -9,393 11,733 -6,183 9,770 -12,821 12,667 
       
Competence level start medical 
education       
GPA's 0,716 0,635   0,739 0,667 
First Progress Test score first year -0,359 0,704   -0,456 0,739 
       
Competence level and medical 
education       
Final Progress Test 4th year   0,050 0,582 -0,235 0,661 
Skills Test score 4th year   0,608 0,520 0,725 0,603 
       
Control Variables       
Male 0,489 1,154 0,857 1,235 0,829 1,239 
Age  0,424 0,435 0,301 0,363 0,539 0,469 
Year of entry 1996 9,668 60,717 9,982 60,405 9,888 59,549 
Year of entry 1997 1,308 1,073 1,407 1,123 1,649 1,187 
Year of entry 1998 2,290* 1,294 2,281* 1,310 2,688*      1,400 
Year of entry 1999 10,214 52,650 10,011 53,322 10,746 49,365 
              
       
Model Statistics       
Number of cases (n)  294  294  294 
Model chi-square  10,473  10,328  11,876 
d.f.  8  8  10 
p  0,233  0,243  0,293 
              
Note 1: standardized values are used for all competence indicator variables 
Note 2: Year of entry 2000 is the reference category for the 'year of entry' control variables 
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Effects of competence levels on obtaining a specialisation position 
For our second labour market indicator, obtaining a specialisation position (dummy), it 
appears from table 1 that 43% of those who work as a physician indeed has obtained one. 
With a binary logistic regression we measure the effects of competence indicators at the start 
and at the end of medical education on having acquired a specialisation position. The results 
of the analyses are presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Regression estimates of the effects of competence levels at the start and at the end of medical 
education on having a specialisation position a year and a half after graduation 
       
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B s.e. B s.e B s.e. 
              
       
Constant -2,645 1,638 
 -
3,266** 1,567  -3,070* 1,689 
       
Competence level  
start medical education 0,016 0,122   -0,034 0,133 
GPA's 0,074 0,212    0,053 0,213 
First Progress Test score first year       
       
Competence level  
end medical education       
Final Progress Test 4th year    0,025 0,131  0,034 0,138 
Skills Test score 4th year    0,191 0,136  0,193 0,137 
       
Control Variables       
Male -0,401 0,256 -0,361 0,259 -0,359 0,260 
Age  0,071 0,056  0,090* 0,054  0,084 0,058 
Year of entry 1996 0,671 0,542  0,668 0,542  0,681 0,545 
Year of entry 1997 0,536 0,515  0,573 0,516  0,558 0,519 
Year of entry 1998 0,725 0,511  0,794 0,512  0,777 0,515 
Year of entry 1999 0,575 0,526  0,614 0,526  0,595 0,528 
              
       
Model Statistics       
Number of cases (n)  290  290  290 
Model chi-square  6,237  8,476  8,589 
d.f.  8  8  10 
p  0,621  0,388  0,571 
              
Note 1: standardized values are used for all competence indicator variables 
Note 2: Year of entry 2000 is the reference category for the 'year of entry' control variables 
* significant at the 0.1 level 
 
The results show no effects for any of the included competence indicators. The findings 
suggest there are no explaining effects of competence levels on the chances for obtaining a 
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specialisation as such. Only a slightly significant positive effect of age is found in the second 
model. Therefore we may conclude that the results so far suggest evidence for the 
Credential argument; the medical degree as such is sufficient for a relevant job and obtaining 
a specialisation position is merely a matter of luck (or other selection criteria not included in 
our analyses) afterwards. 
 
However, the selection bias in our data indicates there is more to conclude. And in addition, 
both in specialisation positions and in non-specialisation positions heterogeneity can be 
assumed to be present (see appendix 2 for argumentation). Therefore we continue with 
considering the effects of the more qualifying and screening role of education on the chances 
to obtain different types of jobs (specialisation positions and non-specialisation positions). 
 
Effects of competence levels on obtaining different types of physicians’ jobs 
We conduct multi-nominal regression analyses (MNRA) for the largest categories of jobs in 
the sample, consisting of residents not in training, medical Ph.D. students, residents in 
training for hospital specialisations, general practitioners in training (GP’s in training), and 
physicians in training for specialisations in social medicine. Table 4 presents the results. 
 
As table 4 indicates, we took the hospital specialisation positions as the reference category.  
The following effects are found: 
The negative effect of being male for the social medicine category compared to the hospital 
specialists in training is in all three models consistent; being female enlarges your chance to 
obtain a training position in social medicine after graduation considerably.  To a much 
smaller extent, a higher age enhances your chance to obtain the same type of job as well. 
In the second model, the end-level competence indicators are tested; negative effects are 
found for the final Progress Test score for physicians in a training position for social medicine 
(compared to the hospital specialists in training). A one standard deviation higher score on 
the final Progress Test leads to significant negative effects on the odds of obtaining a training 
position in social medicine, compared to becoming a hospital specialist in training of 0.56, 
implying a decrease of 44% in the odds ratio. This is the expected change, remaining all 
other variables constant. In terms of what this decrease will mean for one’s chance to obtain 
a training position in social medicine, the odds ratio can be written as the relative chance to 
obtain this type of job (sm), compared to a hospital specialisation in training job (hs) and 
calculate the differences in the chance for different values of the separate (relevant) 
variables, by considering a reference person (for example a female with mean age, with 
mean scores on the competence indicators, entered in the labour market in the reference 
year 2000). 
These differences in the chance to obtain a training position in social medicine are presented 
in table 5 based on our reference person. We include the relevant effects of gender, age, and 
the final Progress Test score from the second model of our MNRA, to show their separate 
effects on the chance, remaining the other variables constant. 
 
 Table 4 
Estimates of the effects of competence level indicators on having different types of jobs (not in specialisation and specialisation positions) compared to having a hospital 
specialisation position (resident in training) 
      
 General Practitioner Social Medicine Resident not in training PhD student Model statistics 
  estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. n -2 Log 
Likelihood 
           
           
model 1            
Intercept 1,073 2,830 -5,163 3,349 4,064 2,669 1,930 4,457 260 634,507 
            
Competence level start medical education  
GPA's -0,079 0,219 -0,514 0,331 -0,119 0,187 0,399 0,313    
First Progress Test first year 0,565 0,371 -0,270 0,484 0,075 0,324 0,521 0,560    
           
Control Variables            
Male -0,504 0,466 -2,133*** 0,830 -0,097 0,387 0,107 0,678    
Age  -0,012 0,094 0,190* 0,109 -0,078 0,090 -0,069 0,156    
Year of entry 1996 0,888 1,070 -0,222 1,271 -0,282 0,917 -0,825 1,348    
Year of entry 1997 -0,649 1,011 -1,048 1,202 -0,859 0,835  -2,100* 1,276    
Year of entry 1998 0,047 1,012 0,058 1,169 -0,645 0,856 -1,788 1,285    
Year of entry 1999 -0,387 1,078 -0,209 1,244 -0,460 0,890 -0,194 1,179    
                      
model 2            
Intercept -1,349 2,563 -4,667 2,933 3,800 2,500 1,884 4,419 260 640,945 
            
Competence level end medical education            
Final Progress Test score fourth year   -0,232 0,230 -0,587* 0,325 -0,246 0,198 0,153 0,337    
Skills Test score fourth year 0,276 0,240 -0,104 0,287 0,020 0,197 0,023 0,368    
           
Control Variables            
Male -0,501 0,469 -2,136** 0,835 -0,091 0,392 -0,137 0,675    
Age 0,065 0,086 0,178* 0,098 -0,071 0,085 -0,066 0,154    
Year of entry 1996 0,807 1,063 -0,177 1,272 -0,213 0,919 -1,013 1,319    
Year of entry 1997 -0,426 1,001 -1,090 1,181 -0,780 0,833 -2,006 1,264    
  
 
Table 4 (continued) 
Estimates of the effects of competence level indicators on having different types of jobs (not in specialisation and specialisation positions) compared to having a hospital 
specialisation position (resident in training) 
      
 General Practitioner Social Medicine Resident not in training PhD student Model statistics 
  estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. n -2 Log 
Likelihood 
           
           
Year of entry 1998 0,259 1,004 -0,041 1,137 -0,596 0,852 -1,675 1,278    
Year of entry 1999 -0,192 1,070 -0,260 1,216 -0,400 0,885 -0,196 1,170    
                      
model 3            
Intercept 0,638 2,860 -5,319 3,462 4,064 2,683 1,955 4,418 260 632,671 
            
Competence level start medical education  
GPA's -0,051 0,234 -0,330 0,356 -0,053 0,198 0,402 0,341    
First Progress Test score first year 0,539 0,372 -0,268 0,490 0,068 0,322 0,485 0,559    
            
Competence level end medical education            
Final Progress Test score fourth year   -0,232 0,242 -0,489 0,343 -0,228 0,206 -0,036 0,360    
Skills Test score fourth year 0,258 0,245 -0,024 0,295 0,021 0,198 -0,044 0,369    
            
Control Variables            
Male -0,442 0,474 -2,109** 0,835 -0,084 0,395 0,070 0,694    
Age -0,001 0,095 0,192* 0,111 -0,080 0,090 -0,069 0,153    
Year of entry 1996 0,990 1,078 -0,098 1,280 -0,204 0,922 -0,827 1,353    
Year of entry 1997 -0,563 1,016 -0,948 1,211 -0,800 0,839 -2,068 1,277    
Year of entry 1998 0,136 1,018 0,127 1,181 -0,617 0,861 -1,780 1,291    
Year of entry 1999 -0,298 1,082 -0,174 1,250 -0,433 0,894 -0,201 1,183    
           
Note 1: Standardized values have been used for all competence variables 
Note 2: Year of entry 2000 is the reference category (dummy control variables) 
* significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05 and *** significant at 0.01
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Table 5 
Changes in chance to obtain a training position in social medicine (sm) compared to a hospital 
specialisation in training position (hs) 
   
  Chance to obtain sm versus hs 
    
    
    model 2 of the MNRA 
Chance for reference person:  14% 
    
Changes in chance for relevant predictors:   
Age: 27,55 (mean)  
 30 (+ 1sd) +10.3% 
Gender: female (reference)  
 male  -12% 
fPTscore fourth year: 0 (standardized mean)  
 1 (+ 1sd) -4.5% 
    
Note 1: the reference person has mean age, is female, has mean competence indicator scores and 
entered the labour market in 2000 (reference category) 
Note 2: fPTscore = final Progress Test score 
 
Returning to table 5, in the third model of our MNRA, including both start-level and end-level 
competence indicators, no effects of any of the competence indicators have left. Only the 
already mentioned effects of gender and age remain present. Apparently, in the end, the 
selection of candidates for different physicians’ jobs seems not to be regulated by their 
competence levels very much, at least not in our research sample. 
 
Although the results of our MNRA already ‘predict’ the outcomes of our final analysis, in 
which we intend to concentrate on the three specific medical specialisation (training) 
positions, we conduct this analysis as planned. 
We order the three specialisation positions according to the duration of their training periods, 
reflecting the opportunity to obtain a higher expected lifetime income (see also Appendix 2).  
 
Effects of competence levels on three types of specialisation positions (ordered) 
With ordinal regression analyses we test the effects of start- and end-level competence on 
the acquisition of a specialisation position of a longer duration, controlled for gender, age, 
and relevant years of entry in the labour market again. In this respect, the social medicine in 
training category is considered the lowest and the hospital specialisations (residency 
positions in training) the highest category, while general practitioners’ training lies in 
between. Table 6 presents the results. 
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Table 6 
Estimates of the effects of competence levels at the start and at the end of medical education on 
obtaining a higher ranked specialisation position based on required further training investment 
(reflecting expected lifetime income) 
    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. 
       
       
Tresholds (a)       
General Practitioner -2,388* 1,275    -2,790** 1,156   -2,677** 1,321 
Hospital Specialisation -0,977 1,262 -1,378 1,140 -1,253 1,307 
       
Competence level start education       
GPA's 0,189 0,117   0,161 0,126 
First Progress Test score first year -0,030 0,168   -0,034 0,168 
       
Competence level end education       
Final Progress Test score in fourth 
year     0,200* 0,119 0,161 0,123 
Final Skills Test score of fourth 
year   -0,052 0,117 -0,081 0,120 
       
Control Variables       
Male     0,695*** 0,252    0,610** 0,253      0,657*** 0,256 
Age -0,058 0,040  -0,072* 0,038 -0,066 0,041 
Year of entry 1996 -0,233 0,503 -0,222 0,498 -0,294 0,507 
Year of entry 1997  0,237 0,517  0,240 0,482 0,194 0,519 
Year of entry 1998 -0,182 0,496 -0,189 0,471 -0,236 0,501 
Year of entry 1999 -0,016 0,525 -0,017 0,512 -0,043 0,528 
        
Model Statistics       
Number of cases (n)  112  112  112 
 -2 Log Likelihood  217,737  217,540  215,846 
Model Chi-square  14,029  14,226  15,920 
df  8  8  10 
p  0.081  0,076  0,102 
Link: Probit 
             
a The reference category is Social Medicine. 
* Significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05 and *** significant at 0.01. 
Note 1: Standardized values are used for all competence indicator variables. 
Note 2: Year of entry 2000 is the reference category for the 'year of entry' control variables. 
 
As can be seen from table 6, the ordinal regression model is estimated as a probit linked 
threshold model with three categories. They represent the distances between ordered 
outcomes for which the exact distances between the categories is unknown, but for which 
the ordering represents an underlying continuous variable, such as in our study the amount 
of investment in training (see also Long, 1997; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). The results can be 
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interpreted as follows: being a male enlarges the chances for specialisation positions of a 
longer duration in all models. The effects are estimated as a part of the distance between the 
categories (threshold 2 – threshold 1), which is –2.388–(-0.977))= -1.411 in the first model. 
When the effect of being male is 0.695, this is less than a half of the distance of 1.411. This 
may be interpreted as the effect of male on the job outcome is on average almost half a 
higher ranked job category. In the second and third model the effect of gender is related to 
almost the same amount (almost a half) of a category higher outcome. It must be noted that 
the chance to obtain a GP in training position is the highest in general. With respect to the 
start level competence indicators, no effects are found. For the end-level indicators, a 
positive effect is found for the final Progress Test score. Its effect expects the chance to 
obtain a ‘higher’ position to increase for the distance of about only a seventh of a category, 
when scoring one standard deviation higher on the test. A higher age has a small negative 
effect to obtain a higher position in the ranked ordering of specialisation positions. However, 
in the third and final model, only the effect of being a male remains present, and the other 
effects disappear. Thus, even when ordering only the types of specialisations, no real 
differentiation of the candidates based on their competence levels is explaining their 
allocation over the different positions. Gender is the most important factor in explaining the 
differences. 
 
Summary of results 
Overall, the effects in our regression analyses seem to suggest marginal roles of differential 
competence acquisition in medical education, and/or a more screening function of medical 
education for labour market outcomes of physicians. Although the start level indicators of 
competence predict levels of competence at the end of education (as confirmed in the 
analysis in Appendix 4), they reveal no further explaining effects for labour market outcomes, 
not even after controlling for the end level indicators of competence (relation a, i.e. the 
screening argument can not be confirmed). From the end-level indicators in our models, the 
final Progress Test scores seem to have some effects (relation b, i.e. the human capital 
argument is partly confirmed), but when controlling for the start level indicators of 
competence again, these effects disappear (relation b is not fully confirmed). These are 
remarkable findings, merely suggesting credit for the Credentialism view. However, 
considering the already higher levels in scores on all competence indicators for the research 
subjects, due to selective processes, a more differentiated approach in interpreting the 
results is needed. Because both levels of competence at the start and at the end of 
education are higher for the research sample that remains available for our labour market 
analyses, it can not be denied that education both screens students on their already present 
competence (students dropping out from the program have lower mean scores for GPA’s), 
as well as that education equips students (referring to acquisition of human capital) with 
relevant knowledge that affects their labour market entry (the final Progress test reveals 
effects in the analyses, although the remaining research sample has already higher scores). 
This is an indication that the labour market outcomes for physicians are merely based on a 
guaranteed minimum of their competence levels, without further differentiation for good and 
mediocre students. In this respect, it is in fact remarkable that we still find effects of the final 
Progress test scores for our already biased research sample, indicating higher final Progress 
Test scores increase one’s chance to obtain a higher ranked specialisation position, and 
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differentiate the social medicine in training category from other job categories. The fact that 
no effects are found from the start level competence indicators, nor from the end level 
indicators after controlling for the start level indicators, may well be explained in the light of 
the selection effects instead of by being insignificant in themselves. Without considering the 
selection processes (bias), these underlying processes of the rather credential function of 
medical education would not have been visible at all, or not convincing enough. 
 
In the last section of this paper, conclusions will be drawn from the results and considera-
tions for future research will be presented. 
 
5 Conclusion and Discussion 
What we did 
In this paper, an empirical study has been conducted into the role of medical education for 
the selection and allocation on the labour market for physicians, a year and a half after 
graduation. For this purpose, we measured whether medical education really adds to the 
human capital or competences of students. This type of measurement is scarce in labour 
market research, but we had such a measurement available in the unique form of Progress 
Tests scores of medical students during their medical program. However, to separate the 
effects of actual acquired competence from more general and already present capacities of 
physicians, we considered the effects of competence levels for physicians at the start and at 
the end of their medical study separately and controlled for multicollinearity in our data. 
Successful labour market outcomes have been defined in terms of the chances to obtain a 
physicians’ job, a specialisation position, for obtaining a certain type of medical job, and for 
the type of specialisation position obtained (sub-sample), ordered by training duration, 
reflecting further investment in human capital and the expected lifetime income.  
 
What we found 
The results indicate that almost 98,5% of the physicians in our research sample have found a 
relevant job; the medical degree therefore seems to ‘guarantee’ the allocation to relevant 
medical jobs, which is also confirmed by logistic regression analyses, in which no effects of 
competence indicators appear. This finding is in line with the Credentials view. However, 
instead of being irrelevant, the required levels of competences may be of a guaranteed 
minimum, as illustrated by the selection bias towards higher scores in our research sample, 
and therefore not visible in a rather undifferentiated outcome.   
For the chances to obtain a specialisation position as such, no effects have been found for 
competence levels either. This is in line with earlier findings (see e.g. Borghans & 
Ramaekers, 1993) and may be due to the unimportance of differences in competence levels 
of candidates again, but can also be explained by a heterogeneous composition of both 
specialisation and non-specialisation positions.  
Distinguishing the different types of jobs physicians can obtain, and analysing whether 
competence levels have differentiating value for obtaining these jobs, reveals some more 
information. For the social medicine positions it can be said that the positive effect of being 
female is most profound and characteristic, compared to hospital specialisation positions. 
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The question is however, to what extent the preferences of women as a group for social 
medicine are the underlying reason for the gender effect, or whether selection processes and 
structural constraints for different job categories (such as some hospital specialisations) are 
the reason (see for example Gjerberg, 2002).  
However, controlled for gender, age and year of entry in the labour market, the actual 
acquired competence in education seems to differentiate the social medicine in training 
positions from the hospital specialists in training, and therefore in fact from the GP’s in 
training, the residents not in training, and PhD’s as well (human capital argument). This effect 
disappears again when controlling as well for the start level indicators of competence. This 
suggests that the specific competence acquired in education is not differentiating enough, 
compared to the generic component included in the effect, to reveal effects when controlling 
for the already present competence at the start of the study. In all, after having passed the 
final medical qualifying examination, competence levels as measured in this study seem not 
to play an important role in the selection and allocation of physicians on the labour market. 
The same accounts for the findings of our last analysis, in which three specific medical 
training positions have been considered separately, by ordering them according to their 
training period, also reflecting expected lifetime income. This means we cannot find firm 
evidence for a screening or human capital mechanism in the selection and allocation of 
physicians on the medical labour market, or, in other words, no screening or human capital 
acquisitive role of their medical education. 
The measurement properties of the Progress Test seem however to reveal more predictive 
information than the Skills Test, possibly related to the different aspects of competence that 
are measured by these different tests. It is suggested that scoring higher on the Progress 
Test is related to learning or study style aspects of students that are considered to be 
desirable for academic students (see e.g. Van Berkel et al., 1995; Verhoeven, 2003).    
Much effort is currently put in research into the relationships between  (cognitive) ability, 
personality, learning style and work performance (see e.g., Furnham et al., 1999; Austin et 
al., 2002; Zhang, 2003) to detect the relevant aspects and their dynamic behaviour. To draw 
more conclusions in this respect, we would need to extent the study with measurements of 
generic competences, such as learning style data.   
 
What we conclude 
Overall, our results indicate the importance of mainly the credential role of medical education 
for the selection and allocation of physicians on the labour market. However, selection of 
students takes already place during the medical program and passing the final medical 
qualifying examination within a limited range of time (10-12 years, while medical study takes 
numerical 6 years). Therefore the more qualifying and screening role of medical education 
seem merely of importance to garantee a minimum quality of the physicians before entering 
the labour market. However, taking the already higher scores on both start and end level 
competence indicators for the responding subjects on the labour market survey into account, 
this conclusion must be handled with care; it may be possible that the importance of 
differences in competence is not visible in our analyses, because the information of many 
(238 out of 546) graduated physicians is not available due to non-response on the labour 
market survey.   
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Shortcomings and avenues for future research 
Since we only include short-term labour market outcomes, an important question is what 
effects medical education will have on the longer-term labour market outcomes of physicians. 
Will the short-term human capital effects continue to exist, or will there be different outcomes 
with respect to the value of education? Future research into the longer-term labour market 
outcomes is an interesting and necessary road to follow, also considering the changing 
career paths of physicians (Goldacre & Lambert, 2000). Since criteria for labour market 
success may also be linked to the quality of the performance of medical doctors in their work, 
this would be another or related route for future research. 
The promising role of Progress Test scores in measuring acquired competence during 
education and its predictive value for labour market outcome indicators should be further 
tested. What is the relation with generic skills, such as learning styles, what does it mean for 
later labour market functioning? What is the predictive value of the Progress test for later 
clinical performances of doctors? 
 
Final conclusion 
For now we end with the notion that a first attempt has been made to empirically separate 
the possible effects of education, as S  ø  renson (1994) already pled for. The availability of the 
unique Progress Test measurements, in combination with the separate indications of the 
start- and end-level competence of students in their study, informed us fairly well about what 
role(s) the academic medical study plays in the first selection and allocation of physicians on 
the labour market. In this respect, the presence of three possible mechanisms have been 
considered empirically; the value of the medical degree, referring to credentialism; the start 
level competence indications, such as GPA’s, referring to a screening mechanism; and the 
end level competence indications, such as the Progress Test scores and the Skills Test 
scores, referring to a human capital mechanism. By doing this, a step forward has been 
made to develop theory concerning the role of education for labour market outcomes, not 
only for physicians but for other graduates as well.  
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Appendix 1 
The value of Progress Test scores in measuring actual learning accumulation in 
relevant competences in medical education 
The Progress Test in medical education can best be conceived of as a final examination: a 
comprehensive examination reflecting the (cognitive) end-objectives of the curriculum (Van 
der Vleuten et al., 1996). We now literally recall a part of the text in this article by Van der 
Vleuten et al. (1996): “Each Progress Test consists of approximately 250 (multiple) true/false 
questions stratified in categories based on the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). 
It samples knowledge across all disciplines and content areas in medicine relevant for the 
medical degree. Four times per year the progress test is given to all students in the 
curriculum, regardless of their class. For each occasion a newly constructed version is 
prepared. A single test question may be answered with either true or false, or with an ‘I do 
not know’ option (the question mark). The latter option is not penalized or rewarded. A 
correct answer is rewarded with one mark while an incorrect answer is given a negative 
mark. To discourage guessing a total test score is expressed as the number of correct 
answers minus the number of incorrect answers. To allow comparison across tests, scores 
are expressed on a percentage scale. The freshmen year students are not able to answer as 
many questions as the second-year students, who are not able to answer as many as the 
third-year students and so on…”  
 
Measurement with the Progress Test reveals satisfactory reliability coefficients (across years 
usually alphas above 0.95, within years alphas between 0.70-0.80) and test construction is 
highly standardized. Test difficulty variations remain present though. Validity in measuring 
the development in relevant medical competence as an indicator for the actual learning 
process that takes place in education seems although satisfactory, as we argue as follows: 
The measurement is congruent with the educational findings with respect to competence 
development of medical students and physicians; the knowledge component is crucial for this 
process. The development of medical expertise is considered the same as learning to solve 
problems within the medical knowledge domain (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2000). However, the 
knowledge domain has to be solid enough to facilitate the expertise development process. 
This implies the explicit importance of knowledge and the acquisition of this knowledge 
during education. In fact, two types of knowledge are relevant for physicians; conceptual and 
experiential knowledge (Schmidt et al., 1990). The conceptual type is merely acquired during 
formal education, and experiential knowledge is acquired based on the conceptual 
knowledge, during work (Norman, 1988). 
Based on the findings concerning medical knowledge, we assume the specific conceptual 
knowledge acquisition in education to be of major importance to the competence 
development process in education we like to measure. We assume the growth in conceptual 
medical knowledge to be captured and monitored satisfactory with the ‘Progress Test’.  
Although the medical study officially takes six years, the last two years are reserved for the 
so-called clinical clerkships. These clerkships periods can bias the Progress Test scores in 
the fifth and sixth year in two ways: in the first place the learning environment has extremely 
changed, which can affect the scores on the tests, and in the second place, not every 
student has to pass the last tests for graduation, so only the less well scoring students will 
27  
have to do these last tests. We therefore consider the final Progress Test score in the fourth 
year as the end-level indicator of competence developed during education. 
To underline the value of the final Progress Test scores of the fourth year in measuring the 
attained level of medical competence and the difference in this respect with the more 
traditional study results in our sample, we refer to figure 1-3. 
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Figure 1: grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Progress tests  
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Figure 2: grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Block Tests  
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Figure 3: grow curve mean sample scores year 1-4 for Skills Tests 
 
The Progress test scores from our sample reveal comparable findings with respect to growth 
curves on the cohort level, such as presented in the study of Van der Vleuten et al. (1996). In 
addition, no bias was found in growth between the cases in our research sample (restricted 
by the availability of relevant labour market information) and our total data set of students 
that had taken the Progress tests during the relevant cohort periods. 
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Appendix 2 
Argumentation for indicators of labour market success for physicians 
Labour market outcomes for individuals can be considered in terms of chances for a job and 
the quality of the job (Van der Velden & Wieling, 1994; Semeijn & Van der Velden, 2002). 
However, for physicians these labour market outcome indicators do not reveal as much 
information as for other graduates, such as economists. Their chances of obtaining a medical 
job are extremely high because only physicians can attain these jobs and labour market 
demand and supply are highly controlled by institutional regulations, for example by a 
maximum number of specialists that is allowed to be trained, and the numeri fixi for the 
number of students that is allowed to start the medical academic program in the first place. 
The salaries in specialisation positions are highly regulated as well, and therefore not very 
informative either. The chances for attaining a specialisation position seem relevant. It seems 
more successful to obtain a specialisation position faster. However, it can be a well-
considered choice to gain medical experience in a non-specialisation position first, and wait 
for a better or more preferred specialisation position a little later in the career. This leads to 
the situation that both physicians in specialisation and non-specialisation positions, a year 
and a half after graduation, constitute heterogeneous groups. This heterogeneity may be a 
reason why earlier research did not find any further explaining factors for the chances to 
obtain a specialisation position than the medical degree as such. This means that the group 
who did not yet obtain a specialisation position rather shortly after graduation, consists both 
of graduates who are not able to get or want such a position and of graduates who are well 
qualified and are still waiting in the queue. Similarly, the group of specialists in training is 
heterogeneous as well, consisting of positions that require extensive training in highly 
specialized medical area’s (hospital specialisations) and positions that require much less 
further training within a broader field of practice (social medicine). Since both specialisation 
and non-specialisation positions are heterogeneous, we will distinguish the most important 
types of specialisation and non-specialisation positions as a relevant labour market outcome 
in terms of the type of job physicians obtain. And, of course, we will first test our assumption 
with respect to the attainment of a specialisation position as such. 
 
In addition, specialisation positions themselves can be ranked according to the duration of 
the training period. Hospital specialisations take usually 5 to 7 years of training, while general 
practitioners’ training takes 3 years, and the social medicine specialisations 2-2,5 years. In 
economic terms, the highest specialisation type in ranking requires the largest investment in 
human capital and leads to the largest returns in terms of lifetime income. It is common 
knowledge that hospital specialists will earn the most, during their entire career, whereas 
general practitioners earn much less, and social physicians will earn the least, after they 
have completed training. The duration of the training periods therefore reflects the 
individuals’ opportunity to obtain a higher lifetime income. Although the stability of obtained 
specialisation positions shortly after graduation may be fairly low, considering the further 
careers of physicians (see for example Gjerberg, 2002; Goldacre & Lambert, 2000), the 
analysis of (human capital) factors affecting the attainment of a higher ranked position shortly 
after graduation is of interesting value on its own. Starting positions after graduation are 
influential for later labour market outcomes (see e.g., Van den Berg et al., 2002), and 
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although physicians do not choose their specialisation solely based on the expected income, 
economic incentives are found to play a significant role in their choice processes (Thornton, 
2000; Quinn & Price, 1998). 
 
 Appendix 3 
Selection bias in competence levels for a research sample of physicians  
Table I 
Selection bias in physicians' scores in the research sample 
      
  Mean group 1 Sd group 1 Mean group 0 Sd group 0 t p 
       
       
1) Availability of end-level competence indicators (dummy) N=573   N=94       
GPA's (0.408***/ 0.133) 6,83 0,65 6,59 0,54 3,358 0,001 
First Progress Test score in 1st year (0.831*/ 0.467) 4,50 3,27 3,73 3,07 2,160 0,031 
       
2) Graduated by 2000 (dummy) N=546  N=27       
GPA's (-0.407**/ 0.196) 6,82 0,65 6,99 0,80 -1,318 0,188 
First Progress Test score in 1st year (-0.124/ 0.744) 4,51 3,28 4,49 3,10 0,029 0,977 
Final Progress Test score 4th year (0.471**/ 0.224) 32,89 7,94 29,97 10,26 1,832 0,067 
Skills Test score in 4th year (0.161/ 0.189) 80,49 7,93 78,03 12,60 1,149 0,251 
       
3) Labour market response (dummy) N=308  N=238       
GPA's (0.173*/ 0.097) 6,89 0,68 6,72 0,59 3,093 0,002 
First Progress Test score in 1st year (0.224/ 0.331) 4,67 3,30 4,30 3,24 1,312 0,190 
Final Progress Test score 4th year (0.117/ 0.100) 33,72 8,01 31,81 7,74 2,794 0,005 
Skills Test score in 4th year (0.298***/ 0.099) 81,68 7,43 78,95 8,29 4,052 0,000 
   
Note 1: group 1 refers to the available, remaining cases; group 0 refers to the cases that drop out of the sample in the sequential step in the selection process. 
Note 2: there are three vertically written sequential steps (1,2,3) with in step 1, three underlying test scores in the fourth year of study that may reveal missing 
values, referring to drop outs during education. Steps 2 and 3 refer to selection that takes place because of limitation of the study duration (2) and responding to 
the labour market survey (3). 
Note 3: the parameter estimates of the logistic regression analyses are presented between the parentheses, with * significant at the 0.1 level, ** at the 0.05 level, 
and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix 4 
Effects of competence levels at the start on competence levels at the end of medical 
education 
The effects of start-level competence indicators on end-level competence indicators are 
tested by linear regression analyses; for the Progress Test scores at the end of the fourth 
year, and for the Skills Test scores of the fourth year. The results are presented in table I. 
 
Table II 
Regression estimates of the effects of competence indicators at the start of medical education on 
competence indicators at the end of medical education 
   
 Final Progress Test Skills Test 
 fourth year fourth year 
 B s.e. B s.e. 
          
        
Constant 0,261*** 0,075 0,129* 0,078 
        
Competence level start medical 
education        
GPA's 0,315*** 0,039 0,196*** 0,041 
First Progress Test score 1st year 0,415*** 0,144 0,189 0,149 
         
        
Model Statistics        
Number of cases (n)   573   573 
Adj.R2   0,120   0,041 
F   40,135   13,343 
P   0,000   0,000 
          
Note: standardized values are used for all variables 
* significant at 0.10, ** significant at 0.05 and *** significant at 0.01. 
 
As can be seen from table I, higher GPA’s have a positive effect on both competence 
indicators at the end of education. Higher first Progress Test scores of the first year have a 
positive effect on the final Progress Test scores of the fourth year, but not on the Skills Test 
scores of the fourth year. Although the type of instrument should be taken into account, our 
first assumed relation seems confirmed; the competence level just before or at the start of 
medical education affects the level of competence at the end of medical education. This 
means: differentiation in the competence levels at the end of medical education is partly 
predicted by the differences in start levels of the students. And apparently, the types of 
competence that are measured by Progress tests and Skills tests are much more different 
than both of them differ from the competence that is already measured by GPA’s. This is 
suggested by the descriptives (correlations ) in table 1 of the results in the paper as well. 
 
